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We empirically model the causes of corruption and test the economic development–
corruption link in energy-rich economies, using data from 48 countries with energy
resources. The results indicate that energy abundance may not necessarily hurt
economic development in energy-rich countries, allowing enterprises to conduct
business more effectively to reduce corruption, establishing a better political
(democratic) regime improves corruption rankings, and finally while corruption
reduces both the level of GDP per capita and its growth rate, economic development
decreases corruption.
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INTRODUCTION
Data limitations and the complexity of the oil and gas industry have impeded
the efforts of researchers to study and uncover the links between the rents
generated by oil revenues and high levels of corruption as well as the
corruption–development link in energy-rich economies.1 The studies that
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have been undertaken in energy-rich countries (Aslaksen and Torvik, 2005;
Auty, 2001; Damania and Bulte, 2003; Gylfason, 2004) argue that corruption
could be blamed for the failure of a number of energy-rich economies to
develop. This literature has not considered the multi-directional causality
between resource richness, corruption and economic development. We
intend to fill this gap in the literature by providing evidence on both the link
between natural resource wealth and corruption and the lack of development,
with special reference to energy-rich countries.
Our paper relates to several strands of the academic literature. First, it
extends the literature on the corruption–development debate (Aslaksen and
Torvik, 2005; Auty, 2001; Damania and Bulte, 2003; Gylfason, 2004) by
relating the causes of corruption to some energy-specific variables.
Second, our paper is related to a more recent literature that studies the
corruption–growth link using regional level analysis, especially for the region of
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) where the major energy reserves are
located (World Energy Outlook, 2007). These studies include in their cross-
country regressions a number of region-specific institutional variables such as
bureaucratic quality and corruption in order to distinguish the impact of these
variables on economic growth at a regional level. For example, Guetat (2006)
attempts to distinguish the impact of corruption on growth in MENA countries
from of its impact on countries in Latin America, Asia and sub-Sahara Africa.
Their results suggest that corruption may hamper economic growth more in
MENA countries. Gyimah-Brempong and de Camacho (2006) examine regional
differences in the impact of corruption on economic growth in Africa, Asia and
Latin America. They find a negative impact of corruption on the growth of income
per capita, with the largest negative effect in Africa. Kutan et al. (2008) provide
further empirical evidence on the impact of corruption on economic development
in MENA and Latin American countries. They report significant differences in
terms of the impact of corruption on economic development in both regions.
Third, the present paper relates to recent theoretical attempts that model
the corruption–economic growth link conditional on the quality of political
institutions. Aidt et al. (2008) show that corruption may have no significant
impact on economic growth in a regime where political institutions are of low
quality. However, it may hurt growth significantly when political institutions
are of high quality. Our paper is related to theirs, as we estimate the impact of
corruption on growth (and vice versa) conditional upon energy dependency
variables, which play an important role in government policy. In addition, we
test how democratic institutions affect growth and corruption in the presence
of significant energy dependence.
Fourth, our paper is linked to the literature on the resource curse and
rent-seeking behaviour of government bureaucracy in energy-rich countries
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(Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1999a; Auty, 1994; Gylfason et al., 1999, Leite and
Weidmann, 1999; Kalyuzhnova, 2008). A recent study by Kalyuzhnova and
Nygaard (2008) brings a different perspective to this literature. They consider
corruption as an element of overall state capacity; in case-specific economies
corruption may be an integral element of the functioning of the economic and
political system. Finally, the paper relates to the literature on the effect of
national oil companies on corruption (Olcott, 2007).
In the next section, we discuss the hypotheses to be tested and outline the
empirical framework and strategy used. The subsequent section describes the
data and presents the empirical evidence. The last section concludes the
paper with some policy implications.
TESTABLE HYPOTHESES, EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK AND ESTIMATION
STRATEGY
In this section, we first discuss our testable hypotheses using arguments
developed in the literature. Next, we summarise our empirical models and
explain our estimation strategy.
Key hypotheses to be tested
One of the key arguments regarding corruption in energy-rich countries
relates to the behaviour of the state bureaucracy with regard to a country’s
resource endowment. The nature of exploration and production in the oil and
gas industry creates a high concentration of capital expenditures, generates a
high level of resource revenue for the government, and through this provides
ample opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking behaviour by the
government bureaucracy. In fact, all 34 less-developed oil-rich countries
‘share one striking similarity: they have weak, or, in some cases, non-existent
political and economic institutions’ (Birdsall and Subramanian, 2004, p. 78).
Corruption and rent seeking by government officials connected to the oil
industry could be ‘exacerbated by use of ‘‘off-budget’’ accounts (including
those established by national oil companies)’ (ODI/UNDP, 2006, p. 14). Thus
the existence of regulations and a state bureaucracy to enforce them as well as
entire political regimes in energy-rich countries are open to corruption. Thus,
we argue that political institutions may hurt or improve corruption
conditional upon the level of energy dependency, formulating the following
hypotheses specific to energy-rich economies:
Hypothesis 1. Corruption is higher in energy-rich countries where state
bureaucracy is high or ease of doing business is low.
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Hypothesis 2. Democratic regimes foster corruption in countries with significant
energy dependency.
Corruption may also be affected by education level or human capital
stock in a given country. Gylfason (2001) shows that public spending on
education in resource-rich countries is inversely related to the share of natural
capital in national wealth across countries because natural capital tends to
crowd out human capital. Hence, we develop our third hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 3. Energy-abundant countries with low level of education are likely
to be more corrupt.
Another key argument discussed in the literature is the link between
economic growth, resource richness and corruption. The few studies
analysing the poor economic performance of resource-rich economies (Auty,
2001; Gylfason, 2001) overlooked the important possibility of bi-causality,
where poor economic performance causes corruption and corruption causes
economic decline. Using a dynamic general equilibrium model of economic
growth, Blackburn et al. (2005) derive a theoretical link between corruption,
economic development and a number of other variables. They show that the
relationship between corruption and economic growth is both negative and
bi-causal in general. From these arguments we derive our fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. There is a negative and bi-causal relationship between corruption
and growth in energy-rich economies.
It is possible that corruption may not affect the growth rate of GDP, but
just its level. Hence, we derive the following final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. There is negative and bi-causal relationship between corruption
and economic development, measured by the level of GDP per capita, in energy-
rich economies.
Empirical models
We estimate two sets of two equations, the first set for the growth rate of real
GDP per capita and corruption, and the other one for the level of real GDP per
capita and corruption. In the economic growth equation, our focus variable is
corruption and energy-specific variables. We also use several control
variables to account for the other potential determinants of economic
growth. Regarding the latter, standard growth theory (ie Solow, 1956; Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1991) and new growth theory suggest that capital
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accumulation and human capital are important factors determining long-term
growth (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Romer, 1990). We therefore expect a
positive coefficient for these variables. As proxies for capital accumulation,
we use government expenditures, gross fixed capital formation, foreign direct
investment (FDI) and infrastructure (percentage of total roads paved). In
addition, following some recent studies we have included democracy and
openness variables in estimations and these studies have presented evidence
that better democratic systems and a higher level of openness increase growth
significantly (Bardhan, 1997; Durham, 1999; Rodrik, 2000; Sachs and Warner,
1999b, Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001). Democracy is used to measure
institutional quality and openness is utilised as a measure of country’s
openness to foreign trade. Hence, we expect positive coefficients for these two
variables as well.
For the corruption equation, following our testable hypotheses, we
include the growth rate of real GDP per capita (level of GDP per capita in
the second set), education, democracy, ease of doing business and energy-
specific variables. The expected signs of these variables are discussed above
when we developed our hypotheses. In addition, we use the following control
variables: openness, democracy index, general government final consump-
tion expenditure as percentage of GDP, economic freedom and external debt.
In terms of the signs of coefficients, we expect that countries that are more
open, having a smaller ratio of government expenditure in GDP, more
economic freedom and less external debt should have lower levels of
corruption. The intuition for the inclusion of these variables into our
regression equations and expected signs come from some related studies
mentioned earlier (Aidt, 2003; Aidt et al., 2008; Mehlum et al., 2006;
Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1999b).
One of the key contributions of our paper is to test the significance of
energy-specific variables on growth and corruption. Both the corruption and
growth estimations include variables reflecting energy dependence. We test
whether such energy dependency variables have any additional explanatory
power beyond those variables typically used to explain growth and
corruption. We use three different ‘measures’ of natural resource endow-
ment/production in explaining the corruption–development–natural resource
relationships (primary exports as a percentage of merchandise exports,
proven oil reserves in bln, bbl, oil production in thousand barrels/day,
natural gas reserves in trillion cubic meters, and natural gas production in
billion cubic meters). We mix the flow with the stock only if they help explain
the oil richness of a country (by explaining the variation in the data matrix as
the first principal component). The impact of energy-specific variables on
growth and other variables is a highly debated issue, and we therefore do not
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assign coefficient signs a priori. Some studies argue that natural resources
might be a curse, others a blessing.2 Also, we use interactive terms combining
energy-specific variables along with other explanatory variables, such as
democracy, to test whether they have any impact on corruption or economic
growth.
Estimation strategy
We estimate the corruption and growth models using a system of equations.
We first test our hypotheses using a system estimation method, weighted two-
stage least squares, for the possible bi-causality between GDP per capita
growth and corruption. We switch from a general to specific model
specification using the adjusted R2, so the seemingly insignificant variables
also contribute positively to explaining the variation in the dependent
variables. However, we use all the exogenous variables as instruments
whether they are in the final equation or not. We later switch to weighted
(across equations) least squares, as we find, using the above method,
economic growth to be insignificant in the corruption equation, indicating no
bi-directional causality between GDP per capita growth and corruption.
Next, we test for the possible bi-causality between the level of GDP per
capita and corruption. We do find two-way causality and thus the estimation
is based on two-stage weighted least squares. Again, we use all the exogenous
variables as instruments including the interactive terms and report the best-
fitting model going from a general to a specific model. As above, the final
model specification is based on the contribution of each variable to the
adjusted R2. In the next section we describe the data and test our hypotheses.
DATA AND FINDINGS
Data
We use data from 48 countries that possess energy resources, either oil or
gas.3 We divide the sample into two groups of countries with significant
energy resources (either oil or gas). Our definition of ‘significant energy
resources’ is whether the oil or gas reserves in the country constitute more
than 0.2% or 0.4% of total world reserves, respectively. Such a division gives
us a non-heterogeneous sample of countries that are listed in Table 1.
2 Some related studies include Gylfason (2001), Knack and Keefer (1995), Murshed (2004),
Rodriguez and Sachs (1999), Sachs and Warner (2001), Torvik (2002), Wick and Bulte (2006).
3 Iraq was an outlier (only 2 years of GDP growth data) so it was not included.
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As mentioned earlier, for energy dependence, we use three proxies in the
estimations: primary exports as a percentage of merchandise exports, proven
oil reserves scaled down using GDP per capita4 and the principal component
of the following energy variables: oil and natural gas production and reserves,
which are also scaled down by GDP per capita.5 In addition, we include a
dummy variable for the presence of a national oil company.6
Owing to the low variation in corruption data over time, we rely only on
cross-sectional data. The data are constructed by averaging the available
years between 1989 and 2006 for each variable. Table 2 provides some
descriptive statistics of the data used in the final estimations based on the














Congo, Rep. Syrian Arab Republic
Denmark Thailand
Ecuador Trinidad and Tobago
Egypt, Arab Rep. Tunisia
Equatorial Guinea Turkmenistan
Gabon United Arab Emirates
India United Kingdom
Indonesia USA




4We scale the reserves down by GDP per capita to control for size. The results are robust even
when we use non-scaled data.
5 The correlation matrix of the variables at hand is not too problematic, so that multi-
collinearity is not an issue.
6 A referee also suggested that we also divided the sample countries into developing and
developed. However, the correlation between this and the dummy variable for the presence of a
national oil company was 0.99. As a result, we only used the latter in the paper.
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general-to-specific model specification using the adjusted R2. The Appendix
provides further information on data and sources.
Corruption and growth regressions
Table 3 reports the results for the equations relating corruption and the
growth rate of GDP per capita and corruption based on the weighted least
squares estimate, because, as mentioned above, the results (not reported)
indicated no bi-causality between GDP per capita growth and corruption.
Hence, the first equation includes the country’s corruption rank as obtained
from Transparency International, which shows more variation than the
corruption score reported by the same organisation, as the dependent
variable. In the ranking data, larger numbers mean a worse corruption
ranking, hence more corruption. The second dependent variable is the growth
rate of GDP per capita.
We first discuss the results for the corruption rank equation. The
estimated coefficient for GDP per capita is significant, indicating that a $1,000
increase in GDP per capita improves the corruption ranking by one step.7 The
democracy index is significant and positive. An increase in the democracy
index meaning a less democratic society, worsens the corruption ranking. We
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of regression variables
Mean Std. dev.
GDP per capita level 7107.69 9185.99
GDP per capita growth rate 2.53 4.20
Democracy index 101.04 51.26
Business index 90.67 51.52
Education Primx 3501.40 2497.45








Notes: PC1: The principal component of the following energy variables: oil and natural gas production
and their reserves scaled down by GDP per capita. See the Appendix for the full definitions of the
abbreviations.
7 The dummy variable for the presence of a state oil ownership was insignificant in the
regressions, suggesting that corruption is not sensitive to a particular ownership (state versus
private) for energy. Hence, one could extend the same conclusion to the development dummy due to
the high correlation between the two dummy variables.
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also note that an increase in the highly significant business index, meaning
more regulation on business activity, moves the country down in the
corruption ranking. One can interpret this as reflecting the growing need for
‘greasing the wheels’ as the business environment deteriorates. When the
education index (Education) interacts with the share of primary exports in
total merchandise exports, Primx, our proxy for resource abundance, we
observe that resource-abundant countries with a higher level of education are
likely to be less corrupt. Thus, these results support our three testable
hypotheses 1–3.
Regarding our proxies for energy abundance variables, the interaction of
Primx with proven oil reserves shows that resource-abundant countries with
higher levels of oil reserves are likely to become more corrupt. The results for
the principal component for oil and gas-related measures, PC1, have the
opposite effect on corruption ranking, suggesting an increase in energy
production and reserves alone causes improved rankings in corruption.
Table 3: GDP per capita growth and corruption regressions
Variable Corruption Variable GDP growth
Constant 42.99 Constant 5.756
(0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.001 Openness 0.012
(0.05) (0.16)
Democracy 0.128 Democracy 0.010
(0.07) (0.19)
Business 0.366 Government 0.070
(0.00) (0.09)
Primx Education 0.004 FDI 0.276
(0.24) (0.00)
PrimxOil reserves 0.082 Infrastructure 0.023
(0.60) (0.04)
PC1 1.756 Education 0.038
(0.32) (0.04)






Adjusted R-squared 0.74 0.41
N 45 46
Notes: P-values are displayed in the parentheses for significance levels. Primx: Primary exports
(percentage of merchandise exports); Democracy: Democracy index; Business: Ease of doing business
index; PC1: principal component for oil and gas-related measures; Government: General government final
consumption expenditure as percentage of GDP; Education: Initial schooling enrolment secondary
percentage to gross. See the Appendix for further data definition.
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Finally, proven oil reserves have a very significant additional effect
beyond that captured by the PC1 variable alone. By itself, this variable
causes a reduction in the corruption level and leads a country to drop
down 14 levels in the corruption rankings. Because the PC1 variable captures
both production and reserve effects, the results suggest that they play an
important role together in determining the corruption ranks in energy-rich
economies.
Note that it is the interaction between Primx and energy reserves, which
causes a higher level of corruption. That is, an increase in Primx oil reserves
variable brings about a worsening in corruption rankings, reflecting the
‘resource curse’ effects. Higher levels of energy production and reserves
themselves may, on the other hand, capture improvements in per capita GDP
levels because of higher energy production and stocks, hence lowering the
corruption level. The estimated model is able to explain about 74% of the
cross-country variation in corruption.
We now discuss the results for the growth equation. Traditional variables
such as openness, democracy and FDI do affect the growth rate of GDP per
capita in energy-rich economies. The FDI variable has the most significant
impact on growth: a 1% increase in net FDI flows/GDP brings about a 0.28%
increase in the GDP per capita growth rate. Government consumption has a
negative impact on growth, perhaps capturing some crowding out effects.
Infrastructure has a positive contribution to the growth rate. Education has an
unexpected sign, which may be due to low variation in the sample. The
corruption variable itself indicates that countries with high corruption tend to
have lower growth rates. Both energy abundance variables, Primx oil
reserves and PC1, have the same negative effect on growth, much as in the
corruption equation. An increase in energy production and reserves reduces
the growth rate based on the coefficient of the Primx oil reserves variable.
The estimated model is able to explain about 41% of the cross-country
variation in the growth rate.
Corruption and GDP per capita level regressions
Table 4 reports the level regression results where the level of GDP per capita is
the dependent variable in the second equation. Here, the results showed two-
way causality and the estimation is based on two-stage weighted least
squares. As in Table 3, the instruments used in Table 4 are all the exogenous
variables including interactive terms and we report the best-fitting model
going from a general to a specific model, looking at the contribution of each
variable to the adjusted R2.
Looking at the corruption equation first, we can see that a higher level of
GDP per capita improves corruption rankings. Ease of doing business is both
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statistically and economically significant and positive: a 1 rank reduction in
the business index, indicating improvement in business conditions, moves
the corruption rank down by close to 3 (1/0.371) steps, to a lower level of
corruption. This finding indicates that policy makers need to reduce
regulations, so as to reduce opportunities for officials to extract bribes from
businesses. Some energy-abundance interaction terms also contribute to
explaining the variance in per capita GDP. For example, when the Education
variable interacts with Primx, we observe a decline, and hence improvement
in, corruption rankings, a finding similar to the growth rate results.
Regarding energy abundance variables, the second interactive term
(Democracy Primx) has a positive sign, suggesting a worsening in
corruption ranks in energy-rich countries with low levels of democracy;
recall that an increase in the democracy index shows a less democratic
country. The principal component variable, PC1, capturing the impact of oil
and gas production and reserves, is negative. This shows that an increase in
energy production and reserves moves the ranking down, meaning less
corruption, due to a higher expected level of economic development in the
future due from today’s higher energy production and stocks.
Table 4: Determinants of corruption and GDP per capita/level
Variable Corruption Variable GDP Per Capita
Constant 57.47 Constant 13186.04
(0.00) (0.000)
GDP per capita 0.001 Democracy 5.86
(0.03) (0.83)
Business 0.371 Government 382.95
(0.000) (0.01)
Primx Education 0.005 Corruption 154.97
(0.01) (0.000)
PrimxDemocracy 0.00005 Primx Democracy 0.511
(0.96) (0.04)
PC1 0.92 PC1 482.98
(0.61) (0.35)




Adjusted R-squared 0.72 0.64
N 44 44
Notes: P-values are displayed in the parentheses for significance levels. Primx: Primary exports
(percentage of merchandise exports); Democracy: Democracy index; Business: Ease of doing business
index; PC1: principal component for oil and gas-related measures; Government: General government final
consumption expenditure as percentage of GDP; Education: Initial schooling enrolment secondary
percentage to gross. See the Appendix for further data definition.
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Similar to the results in Table 3, the Primx oil reserves and oil reserves
variables have the opposite effects on corruption. An increase in Primx oil
reserves variable brings about a worsening in corruption rankings, while
higher levels of energy production and reserves lower the corruption level.
The estimated model is able to explain about 72% of cross-country variation
in corruption ranks.
We next discuss the results for the level of GDP per capita. First, we find
that an improvement in democracy (a decline in the index) increases GDP per
capita. Second, Government, general government final consumption expen-
diture as percentage of GDP, is significant and positive, suggesting that
government spending adds to the standard of living. On the other hand, an
increase in corruption, reflecting an increase in the index, reduces the GDP
per capita. The only significant interactive term in the model is Democracy-
Primx and it has a negative sign, suggesting that GDP per capita is lower in
energy-rich countries with low levels of democracy. Finally, the principal
component term is positive, showing that an increase in energy production
and reserves alone would increase GDP per capita.
The Primx oil reserves variable is significant and positive, suggesting that
energy abundance increases economic development. Note that this finding is
opposite to that in Table 3 on growth: while energy abundance appears to lower
economic growth, it may improve economic development, measured by the
level of GDP per capita. This finding suggests that energy abundance may not
be a curse for economic development. The estimated model is able to explain
about 64% of cross-country variation in GDP per capita.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We have tested several hypotheses regarding the determinants of corruption
in energy-rich economies. Concerning our first hypothesis, we found that
easing regulations on business activity reduces corruption. With respect to
our second hypothesis, we find results that establishing a more democratic
regime improves corruption rankings. Testing our third hypothesis, we
observe that energy-rich countries with a higher level of education tend to
have less corruption. For the last two hypotheses, we found that there is no
bi-causality between corruption and the GDP per capita growth rate, but that
there is one between corruption and the level of GDP per capita. Corruption
reduces both the growth rate of GDP per capita and its level while the level of
GDP per capita only affects corruption, suggesting that it is only the higher
level of economic development, measured by the level of per capita GDP, that
reduces corruption.
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These results suggest that corruption is not only a threat for economic
growth but also for economic development and improvements over time in
the standard of living in energy-rich countries. On the other hand, since
corruption reacts only to GDP per capita but not necessarily the growth rate of
GDP, policy makers need to design long-term development strategies to fight
against corruption. Our results from the GDP per capita regression suggest
that improvements in democracy, fiscal policy, and energy production can
improve the long-term sustainable development of energy-rich countries and
hence aid in their fight against corruption.
In addition, we have discovered some important linkages between our
resource-abundance proxies and socio-economic variables such as education
and the political regime. We have also observed that resource abundance may
not necessarily hurt economic development in energy-rich countries. Without
careful modelling of such linkages, it would be difficult to correctly explain the
patterns of corruption and growth in energy-rich economies. In this sense, our
paper has provided some methodological insights on modelling corruption and
growth in countries with rich energy-specific assets, and this modelling strategy
may also be applicable to countries that posses other types of natural resources.
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In this Appendix, we describe the variables which we used in the presented
regressions.
COR: Corruption Rank. Source: Transparency International, http://
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi,
accessed 22 May 2007.
Energy-specific variables
BARREL: Oil production scaled by GDP per capita. Source: BP Statistical
Review (2006).
GAS: Natural Gas production scaled by GDP per capita. Source:
BP Statistical Review (2006).
ORES: Oil reserves scaled by GDP per capita. Source: BP Statistical
Review (2006).
GRES: Natural Gas reserves scaled by GDP per capita. Source:
BP Statistical Review (2006).
STATE: Dummy variable that is equal to one for the countries which
have state national oil company and equal to zero otherwise.
PRIMX: Primary exports (percentage of merchandise exports). Source:
The World Bank, http://publications.worldbank.org/
subscriptions/WDI/old-default.htm, accessed 18 May 2007.
OILPR: Dummy variable for proved oil reserves – Generally taken to
be those quantities that geological and engineering informa-
tion indicates with reasonable certainty can be recovered in
the future from known reservoirs under existing economic and
operating conditions (equals 1 when oil reserves>0.2% of
world total reserves and 0 otherwise).
Control variables
OPEN: Openness – the sum of merchandise exports and imports
divided by the value of GDP, in % (all in current US$) Source:
The World Bank, http://publications.worldbank.org/subscrip
tions/WDI/old-default.htm, accessed 18 May 2007.
GDPPC: GDP per capita. Source: The World Bank, http://publications.
worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI/old-default.htm, accessed
18 May 2007.
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GDPPCG: GDP per capita growth. Source: The World Bank, http://
publications.worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI/old-default.htm,
accessed 18 May 2007.
DEMOCRACY: Democracy index – The Economist Intelligence Unit’s democ-
racy index is based on five categories: electoral process and
pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government;
political participation; and political culture. Source: Laza
Kekic, The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy,
Economist Intelligence Unit 2006, http://www.economist.
com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf, accessed
18 May 2007.
GOVERNMENT: General government final consumption expenditure as percen-
tage of GDP. Source: The World Bank, http://publications.
worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI/old-default.htm, accessed
18 May 2007.
ECONFR: Economic freedom – ranking based on economic theory and
empirical study. It identifies the variables that comprise
economic freedom and analyses the interaction of freedom
with wealth. Source: The Heritage Foundation, Index of
Economic Freedom 2007, http://www.heritage.org/research/
features/index/countries.cfm?sortby=country.
BUSINESS: Ease of doing business index is calculated as the ranking on
the simple average of country percentile rankings on each of
the 10 topics covered in WB ‘Doing business’ database.
Source: The World Bank, http://publications.worldbank.org/
subscriptions/WDI/old-default.htm, accessed 18 May 2007.
EXDEBT: External debt – debt in US$. Source: The World Bank, http://
publications.worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI/old-default.
htm, accessed 18 May 2007.
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows (percentage of GDP).
Source: The World Bank, http://publications.worldbank.org/
subscriptions/WDI/old-default.htm, accessed 18 May 2007.
ROAD: Roads, paved (percentage of total roads). Source: The World
Bank, http://publications.worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI/
old-default.htm, accessed 18 May 2007.
EDUCATION: Initial schooling enrolment secondary % to gross. Source:
World Development Indicators, http://publications.worldbank.
org/WDI/.
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